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ABSTRACT
In one perspective, the main theme of this research revolves around the inverse
problem in the context of general rough sets that concerns the existence of rough
basis for given approximations in a context. Granular operator spaces and variants
were recently introduced by the present author as an optimal framework for anti-
chain based algebraic semantics of general rough sets and the inverse problem. In
the framework, various sub-types of crisp and non-crisp objects are identifiable that
may be missed in more restrictive formalism. This is also because in the latter cases
concepts of complementation and negation are taken for granted - while in reality
they have a complicated dialectical basis. This motivates a general approach to di-
alectical rough sets building on previous work of the present author and figures of
opposition. In this paper dialectical rough logics are invented from a semantic per-
spective, a concept of dialectical predicates is formalised, connection with dialetheias
and glutty negation are established, parthood analyzed and studied from the view-
point of classical and dialectical figures of opposition by the present author. Her
methods become more geometrical and encompass parthood as a primary relation
(as opposed to roughly equivalent objects) for algebraic semantics.
KEYWORDS
Rough Objects; Dialectical Rough Semantics; Granular operator Spaces; Rough
Mereology; Polytopes of Dialectics; Antichains; Dialectical Rough Counting;
Axiomatic Approach to Granules; Constructive Algebraic Semantics; Figures of
Opposition; Unified Semantics
1. Introduction
It is well known that sets of rough objects (in various senses) are quasi or partially or-
derable. Specifically in classical or Pawlak rough sets Pawlak (1991), the set of roughly
equivalent sets has a quasi Boolean order on it while the set of rough and crisp objects
is Boolean ordered. In the classical semantic domain or classical meta level, associated
with general rough sets, the set of crisp and rough objects is quasi or partially orderable.
Under minimal assumptions on the nature of these objects, many orders with rough on-
tology can be associated - these necessarily have to do with concepts of discernibility.
Concepts of rough objects, in these contexts, depend additionally on approximation op-
erators and granulations used. Many generalizations of classical rough sets from granular
perspectives have been studied in the literature. For an overview the reader is referred
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to Mani (2018a). These were part of the motivations for the invention of the concept of
granular operator spaces by the present author in Mani (2015) and developed further
in Mani (2016b, 2016c, 2017b). In the paper, it is shown that collections of mutually
distinct objects (relative to some formulas) form antichains. Models of these objects,
proposed in the paper, have been associated with deduction systems in Mani (2017b).
Collections of antichains can be partially ordered in many ways. Relative to each of
these partial orders, maximal antichains can be defined. Maximal antichains are sets of
mutually distinct objects and any of its supersets is not an antichain. In one sense, this
is a way of handling roughness. To connect these with other rough objects, various kinds
of negation-like operations (or generalizations thereof) are of interest. Such operations
and predicates are of interest when rough parthoods are not partial or quasi orders
Mani (2012b, 2016c); Polkowski (2011).
Given some information about approximations in a context, the problem of providing
a rough semantics is referred to as an inverse problem. This class of problems was in-
troduced by the present author in Mani (2005) and has been explored in Mani (2012b,
2018b) in particular. The solution for classical rough sets may be found in Banerjee
and Chakraborty (1996). For more practical contexts, abstract frameworks like rough
Y-systems RYS Mani (2012b) are better suited for problem formulation. However, good
semantics may not always be available for RYS. It is easier to construct algebraic seman-
tics over granular operator spaces and generalizations thereof Mani (2016c, 2017b) as
can be seen in the algebraic semantics of Mani (2017b) that involve distributive lattices
without universal negations. Therefore, these frameworks are better suited for solving
inverse problems and the focus of this paper will be limited to these.
The square of opposition and variants, in modern interpretation, refer to the relation
between quantified or modal sentences in different contexts Ioan (1998); Schang (2012).
These have been considered in the context of rough sets in Ciucci, Dubois, and Prade
(2012) from a set theoretical view of approximations of subsets (in some rough set
theories). The relation of parthood in the context of general rough sets with figures has
not been investigated in the literature.This is taken up in the present research paper
(but from a semantic perspective). Connections with dialectical predication and other
kinds of opposition are also taken up in the light of recent developments on connections
of para-consistency and figures of opposition.
At another level of conception, in the classical semantic domain, various sub-types
of objects relate to each other in specific ways through ideas of approximations (the
origin of these approximations may not be known clearly). These ways are shown to
interact in dialectical ways to form other semantics under some assumptions. The basic
structural schema can be viewed as a generalization of ideas like the square and hexagon
of opposition - in fact as a combination of dialectical oppositions involved. This aspect
is explained and developed in detail in the present paper. These are also used for intro-
ducing new methods of counting and semantics in a forthcoming paper by the present
author. In Mani (2009b), a dialectical rough set theory was developed by the present
author using a specific concept of dialectical contradiction that refers to both rough and
classical objects. Related parthood relations are also explored in detail with a view to
construct possible models (semantics).
All these are part of a unified whole - the inverse problem and possible solution
strategies in all its generality. Granular operator spaces and variants Mani (2015, 2016c)
are used as a framework for the problem, and as these have been restricted by the
conditions imposed on the approximations, it makes sense to speak of a part of a unified
whole. Importantly no easy negation like operators are definable/defined in the framework
and this is also a reason for exploring/identifying dialectical negations. So at one level
2
the entire paper is a contribution to possible solutions of the inverse problem and usable
frameworks for the same. This also involves the invention of a universal dialectical
negation (or opposition) from a formal perspective on the basis of diverse philosophical
and practical considerations.
Semantic domains (or domains of discourse) associated with rough objects, oper-
ations and predications have been identified by the present author in Mani (2012b,
2014b), Mani (2016a, 2017b, 2018a). The problem of defining rough objects that per-
mit reasoning about both intensional and extensional aspects posed in Chakraborty
(2016) corresponds to identification of suitable semantic domains. This problem is also
addressed in this research (see Sec4).
The questions and problems that are taken up in this research paper and solved to
varying extents also include the following:
1 What may be a proper formalization of a dialectical logic and dialectical opposition?
• What is the relation between dialetheias, truth gluts and dialectical contra-
diction?
• Should the objects formalised by the logic be interpreted as state transitions?
• How do dialetheias and dialectical contradiction differ?
2 Do paraconsistent logics constitute a proper formalization of the philosophical intent
in Hegelian and Marxist dialectics?
3 What is the connection between parthood in rough contexts and possible dialectical
contradictions?
4 What is a rough dialectical semantics and is every parthood based rough semantics
a dialectical one?
5 How does parthood relate to figures of opposition?
6 What is a useful representation of rough objects that addresses the concerns of
Chakraborty (2016)?
This paper is structured as follows. The next subsection includes background material
on rough concepts, posets, granules and parthood. In the next section, the superiority
of granular operator spaces over property systems is explained. Dialectical negation and
logics are characterised from a critical perspective in the third section. In the following
section, dialectical rough logics are developed and related parthoods are explored. Many
examples are provided in the context of the semantic framework used in the fifth section.
The sixth section is about figures of dialectical opposition generated by few specific
parthood related statements in rough sets and a proposal for handling pseudo gluts.
Some directions are also provided in the section. The reader can possibly omit some of
the philosophical aspects of the section on dialectical negation on a first reading. But a
proper understanding of the section would be useful for applications.
1.1. Background
In quasi or partially ordered sets, sets of mutually incomparable elements are called an-
tichains. Some of the basic properties may be found in Grätzer (1998); Koh (1983). The
possibility of using antichains of rough objects for a possible semantics was mentioned
in Mani (2013-15, 2014a, 2016a) and has been developed subsequently in Mani (2015,
2017b). The semantics invented in the paper is applicable for a large class of operator
based rough sets including specific cases of rough Y- systems (RYS) Mani (2012b) and
other general approaches like Cattaneo and Ciucci (2009); Ciucci (2009); Iwinski (1988);
Yao (1998). In Cattaneo (2018); Cattaneo and Ciucci (2009); Ciucci (2009), negation
like operators are assumed in general and these are not definable operations in terms
3
of order related operations in a algebraic sense (Kleene negation is also not a definable
operation in the situation).
For basics of rough sets, the reader is referred to Pagliani and Chakraborty (2008);
Pawlak (1991); Polkowski (2011). Distinct mereological approaches to rough sets can
be found in Mani (2017b); Polkowski (2011); Polkowski and Skowron (1996).
Many concepts of lower and upper approximation operators are known in the litera-
ture. Relevant definitions are fixed below.
If S is any set (in ZFC), then a lower approximation operator l over S is be a map
l : ℘(S) 7−→ ℘(S) that satisfies:
(∀x ∈ ℘(S))¬(x ⊂ xl) (non-increasing)
(∀x ∈ ℘(S))xl = xll (idempotence)
(∀a, b ∈ ℘(S)) (a ⊆ b −→ al ⊆ bl) (monotonicity)
In the literature on rough sets many variants of the above are also referred to as
lower approximations because the concept has to do with what one thinks a lower
approximation ought to be in the context under consideration. Over the same set, an
upper approximation operator u shall be a map u : ℘(S) 7−→ ℘(S) that satisfies:
(∀x ∈ ℘(S))x ⊆ xu (increasing)
(∀a, b ∈ ℘(S)) (a ⊆ b −→ au ⊆ bu) (monotonicity)
All of these properties hold (in a non-trivial sense) in proto-transitive rough sets Mani
(2016a), while weaker properties hold for lower approximations in esoteric rough sets
Mani (2008, 2018a). Conditions involving both l and u have been omitted for simplicity.
In some practical contexts, lower and upper approximation operators may be partial
and l (respectively u) may be defined on a subset S ⊂ ℘(S) instead. In these cases,
the partial operation may not necessarily be easily completed. Further the properties
attributed to approximations may be a matter of discovery. These cases fall under the
general class of inverse problems Mani (2005, 2012b) where the goal is to see whether
the approximations originate or fit a rough evolution (process). More details can be
found in the next section.
An element x ∈ ℘S will be said to be lower definite (resp. upper definite) if and
only if xl = x (resp. xu = x) and definite, when it is both lower and upper definite.
In general rough sets, these ideas of definiteness are insufficient as it can happen that
upper approximations of upper approximations are still not upper definite.
The concept of a Rough Y-System RYS was introduced by the present author in
Mani (2011, 2012b) and refined further in Mani (2012a) and her doctoral thesis as a
very general framework for rough sets from an axiomatic granular perspective. The
concept is not used in an essential way in the present paper and the reader may skip
the few remarks that involve them. In simplified terms, it is a model of any collection
of rough/crisp objects with approximation operators and a binary parthood predicate
P as part of its signature.
Possible concepts of rough objects considered in the literature include the following:
• Non definite subsets of S; formally, x is a rough object if and only if xl 6= xu.
• Pairs of definite subsets of the form (a, b) that satisfy a ⊆ b.
• Pairs of subsets of the form (xl, xu).
• Sets in an interval of the form (xl, xu); formally,
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• Sets in an interval of the form (a, b) satisfying a ⊆ b with a, b being definite subsets.
• Higher order intervals bounded by definite subsets Mani (2012b).
• Non-definite elements in a RYS Mani (2012b); formally, those x satisfying ¬Pxuxl
are rough objects.
In general, a given set of approximations may be compatible with multiple concepts
of definite and rough objects - the eventual choice depends on one’s choice of semantic
domain. A detailed treatment, due to the present author, can be found in Mani (2012b,
2018a). In Chakraborty (2016), some of these definitions of rough objects are regarded as
imperfect for the purpose of expressing both multiple extensions of concepts and rough
objects - this problem relates to representation (given a restricted view of granularity)
within the classical semantic domain of Mani (2012b).
Concepts of representation of objects necessarily relate to choice of semantic frameworks.
But in general, order theoretic representations are of interest in most contexts. In operator
centric approaches, the problem is also about finding ideal representations.
In simple terms, granules are the subsets that generate approximations and granu-
lations are the collections of all such granules in the context. In the present author’s
view, there are at least three main classes of granular computing (five classes have been
considered by her in Mani (2018a)). The three main classes are
• Primitive Granular Computing Processes (PGCP): in which the problem require-
ments are not rigid, effort on formalization is limited, scope of abstraction become
limited and concept of granules are often vague, though they maybe concrete or
abstract (relative to all materialist viewpoints).
• Classical Granular Computing Paradigm ( CGCP): The precision based classical gran-
ular computing paradigm, traceable to Moore and Shannon’s paper Moore and
Shannon (1956), is commonly understood as the granular computing paradigm
(The reader may note that the idea is vaguely present in Shannon (1948)). CGCP
has since been adapted to fuzzy and rough set theories in different ways. An
overview is considered in Lin (2009). In CGCP, granules may exist at different
levels of precision and granulations (granules at specific levels or processes) form
a hierarchy that may be used to solve the problem in question.
• Axiomatic Approach to Granularity (AAG): The axiomatic approach to granularity,
initiated in Mani (2011), has been developed by the present author in the direction
of contamination reduction in Mani (2012b). The concept of admissible granules,
described below, was arrived in the latter paper and has been refined/simplified
subsequently in Mani (2012a, 2014b, 2017b). From the order-theoretic algebraic
point of view, the deviation is in a very new direction relative the precision-based
paradigm. The paradigm shift includes a new approach to measures.
Historical details can be found in a section in Mani (2016a, 2018a).
Granular operator spaces, a set framework with operators introduced by the present
author in Mani (2015), will be used as considerations relating to antichains will require
quasi/partial orders in an essential way. The evolution of the operators need not be
induced by a cover or a relation (corresponding to cover or relation based systems
respectively), but these would be special cases. The generalization to some rough Y-
systems RYS (see Mani (2012b) for definitions), will of course be possible as a result.
Definition 1.1. A Granular Operator SpaceMani (2015) S is a structure of the form
S = 〈S,G, l, u〉 with S being a set, G an admissible granulation(defined below) over S
and l, u being operators : ℘(S) 7−→ ℘(S) (℘(S) denotes the power set of S) satisfying
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the following (S will be replaced with S if clear from the context. Lower and upper case
alphabets will both be used for subsets ):
al ⊆ a & all = al & au ⊂ auu
(a ⊆ b −→ al ⊆ bl & au ⊆ bu)
∅l = ∅ & ∅u = ∅ & Sl ⊆ S & Su ⊆ S.
Here, admissible granulations are granulations G that satisfy the following three con-
ditions
(t is a term operation formed from the set operations ∪,∩,c , 1, ∅):
(∀a∃b1, . . . br ∈ G) t(b1, b2, . . . br) = al
and (∀a) (∃b1, . . . br ∈ G) t(b1, b2, . . . br) = au, (Weak RA, WRA)
(∀b ∈ G)(∀a ∈ ℘(S)) (b ⊆ a −→ b ⊆ al), (Lower Stability, LS)
(∀a, b ∈ G)(∃z ∈ ℘(S)) a ⊂ z, b ⊂ z & zl = zu = z, (Full Underlap, FU)
Remarks:
• The concept of admissible granulation was defined for RYS in Mani (2012b) using
parthoods instead of set inclusion and relative to RYS, P =⊆, P =⊂.
• The conditions defining admissible granulations mean that every approximation is
somehow representable by granules in a set theoretic way, that granules are lower
definite, and that all pairs of distinct granules are contained in definite objects.
On ℘(S), the relation < is defined by
A < B if and only if Al ⊆ Bl & Au ⊆ Bu. (1)
The rough equality relation on ℘(S) is defined via
A ≈ B if and only if A < B & B < A.
Regarding the quotient ℘(S)| ≈ as a subset of ℘(S), an order b can be defined as
follows:
α b β if and only if αl ⊆ βl & αu ⊆ βu. (2)
Here αl is being interpreted as the lower approximation of α and so on. b will be referred
to as the basic rough order.
Definition 1.2. By a roughly consistent object will be meant a set of subsets of S
with mutually identical lower and upper approximations respectively. In symbols H is
a roughly consistent object if it is of the form H = {A; (∀B ∈ H)Al = Bl, Au = Bu}.
The set of all roughly consistent objects is partially ordered by the inclusion relation.
Relative this maximal roughly consistent objects will be referred to as rough objects. By
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definite rough objects, will be meant rough objects of the form H that satisfy
(∀A ∈ H)All = Al & Auu = Au.
However, this definition of rough objects will not necessarily be followed in this paper.
Proposition 1.3. b is a bounded partial order on ℘(S)| ≈.
Proof. Reflexivity is obvious. If α b β and β b α, then it follows that αl = βl and
αu = βu and so antisymmetry holds.
If α b β, β b γ, then the transitivity of set inclusion induces transitivity of b. The
poset is bounded by 0 = (∅, ∅) and 1 = (Sl, Su). Note that 1 need not coincide with
(S, S).
The concept of generalised granular operator spaces has been introduced in Mani
(2016c, 2017b) as a proper generalization of that of granular operator spaces. The main
difference is in the replacement of ⊂ by arbitrary part of (P) relations in the axioms of
admissible granules and inclusion of P in the signature of the structure.
Definition 1.4. A General Granular Operator Space (GSP) S is a structure of the form
S = 〈S,G, l, u,P〉 with S being a set, G an admissible granulation(defined below) over
S, l, u being operators : ℘(S) 7−→ ℘(S) and P being a definable binary generalized
transitive predicate (for parthood) on ℘(S) satisfying the same conditions as in Def.1.1
except for those on admissible granulations (Generalised transitivity can be any proper
nontrivial generalization of parthood (see Mani (2013-15)). P is proper parthood (de-
fined via Pab if and only if Pab & ¬Pba) and t is a term operation formed from set
operations):
(∀x∃y1, . . . yr ∈ G) t(y1, y2, . . . yr) = xl
and (∀x) (∃y1, . . . yr ∈ G) t(y1, y2, . . . yr) = xu, (Weak RA, WRA)
(∀y ∈ G)(∀x ∈ ℘(S)) (Pyx −→ Pyxl), (Lower Stability, LS)
(∀x, y ∈ G)(∃z ∈ ℘(S))Pxz, &Pyz & zl = zu = z, (Full Underlap, FU)
It is sometimes more convenient to use only sets and subsets in the formalism as these
are the kinds of objects that may be observed by agents and such a formalism would be
more suited for reformulation in formal languages. For this reason higher order variants
of general granular operator spaces have been defined in Mani (2017a) by the present
author. A detailed account can be found in Mani (2018a).
In a partially ordered set chains are subsets in which any two elements are compa-
rable. Antichains, in contrast, are subsets in which no two elements are comparable.
Singletons are both chains and antichains.
1.1.1. Rough Sets and Parthood
It is necessary to clarify the nature of parthood even in set-theoretic structures like
granular operator spaces. The restriction of the parthood relation to the case when
the first argument is a granule is particularly significant. The theoretical assumption
that objects are determined by their parts, and specifically by granules, may not be
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reasonable when knowledge of the context is evolving. Indeed, in this situation:
• granulation can be confounded by partial nature of information and noise,
• knowledge of all possible granulations may not be possible and the chosen set of
granules may not be optimal for handling partial information, and
• the process has strong connections with apriori understanding of the objects in
question.
2. Types of Preprocessing and Ontology
Information storage and retrieval systems (also referred to as information tables, de-
scriptive systems, knowledge representation system) are basically representations of
structured data tables. These have often been referred to as information systems in the
rough set literature - the term means an integrated heterogeneous system that has com-
ponents for collecting, storing and processing data in closely allied fields like artificial
intelligence, database theory and machine learning. So it makes sense to avoid referring
to information tables as information systems Ciucci (2017).
Information tables are associated with only some instances of data in real life. In many
cases, such association may not be useful enough in the first place. It is also possible that
data collected in a context is in mixed form with some information being in information
table form and some in the form of relevant approximations or all the main data is
in terms of approximations. The inverse problem, introduced by the present author in
Mani (2005) and subsequently refined in Mani (2012b), seeks to handle these types of
situations. Granular operator spaces and higher order variants studied by the present
author in Mani (2015, 2017a, 2017b) are important structures that can be used for its
formulation. In simple terms, the problem is a generalization of the duality problem
which may be obtained by replacing the semantic structures with parts thereof. In a
mathematical sense, this generalization may not be proper (or conservative) in general.
The basic problem is given a set of approximations, similarities and some relations
about the objects, find an information system or a set of approximation spaces that fits
the available information according to a rough procedure. In this formalism, a number
of information tables or approximation systems along with rough procedures may fit
in. Even when a number of additional conditions like lattice orders, aggregation and
commonality operations are available, the problem may not be solvable in a unique
sense. Negation-like operations and generalizations thereof can play a crucial role in
possible formalisms. In particular, the ortho-pair approach Cattaneo and Ciucci (2018)
to rough sets relies on negations in a very essential way.
It is also necessary to concentrate on the evolution of negation like operations or pred-
icates at a higher level - because it is always necessary to explain the choice of operations
used in a semantics. The following example (Ex.2.1) from Mani (2017b) illustrates the
inverse problem. Some ways of identifying generalised negation-like predicates are shown
in Ex.2.3 -
Example 2.1. This example has the form of a narrative in Mani (2017b) that gets
progressively complex. It has been used to illustrate a number of computational contexts
in the paper.
Suppose Alice wants to purchase a laptop from an on line store for electronics. Then
she is likely to be confronted by a large number of models and offers from different
manufacturers and sellers. Suppose also that the she is willing to spend less than ex
and is pretty open to considering a number of models. This can happen, for example,
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when she is just looking for a laptop with enough computing power for her programming
tasks.
This situation may appear to have originated from information tables with complex
rules in columns for decisions and preferences. Such tables are not information systems
in the proper sense. Computing power, for one thing, is a context dependent function
of CPU cache memories, number of cores, CPU frequency, RAM, architecture of chip
set, and other factors like type of hard disk storage.
Proposition 2.2. The set of laptops S that are priced less than ex can be totally
quasi-ordered.
Proof. Suppose ≺ is the relation defined according to a ≺ b if and only if price of
laptop a is less than or equal to that of laptop b. Then it is easy to see that ≺ is a
reflexive and transitive relation. If two different laptops a and b have the same price,
then a ≺ b and b ≺ a would hold. So ≺ may not be antisymmetric.
Suppose that under an additional constraint like CPU brand preference, the set of
laptops becomes totally ordered. That is under a revised definition of ≺ of the form:
a ≺ b if and only if price of laptop a is less than that of laptop b and if the prices are
equal then CPU brand of b must be preferred over a’s.
Suppose now that Alice has more knowledge about a subset C of models in the set of
laptops S. Let these be labeled as crisp and let the order on C be ≺|C . Using additional
criteria, rough objects can be indicated. Though lower and upper approximations can
be defined in the scenario, the granulations actually used are harder to arrive at without
all the gory details.
This example once again shows that granulation and construction of approximations
from granules may not be related to the construction of approximations from properties
in a cumulative way.
In Mani (2017b), it is also shown that the number of data sets, of the form mentioned,
that fit into a rough scheme of things are relatively less than the number of those that
do not fit. Many combinatorial bounds on the form of rough object distribution are also
proved in the paper.
Examples of approximations that are not rough in any sense are common in misjudg-
ments and irrational reasoning guided by prejudice. So solutions to the problem can
also help in judging the irrationality of reasoning and algorithms in different contexts.
Example 2.3. Databases associated with women badminton players have the form
of multi-dimensional information tables about performance in various games, practice
sessions, training regimen and other relevant information. Video data about all these
would also be available. Typically these are updated at specific intervals of time. Players
tend to perform better under specific conditions that include the state of the game in
progress. They may also be able to raise the level of their game under specific kinds
of stress - this involves dynamic learning. Additional information of the form can be
expressed in terms of approximations, especially when the associations are not too
perfect. Thus, a statement like
Player A is likely to perform at least as well as player B in playing conditions C
can be translated into Bl ≤ Al where the approximations refer the specific property
under consideration. But this information representation has no obvious rough set basis
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associated and falls under the inverse problem, where the problem is of explaining the
approximations from a rough perspective/basis.
Consider a pair (a, b) with Updates to the database can also be described through
generalised negation-like predicates in the context
2.1. Granular Operator Spaces and Property Systems
Limitations of the property system approach are mentioned in this subsection
In general, data can be presented in real life partly in terms of approximations and in
the object-attribute-value way of representing things (For those that like statistics, the
collection of instances of the sentence has nice statistical properties). Such contexts were
never intended to be captured through property systems or related basic constructors
(see Düntsch and Gediga (2000); Pagliani and Chakraborty (2008); Yao and Yao (2012)).
In particular, the examples of Pagliani (2016) are abstract and the possible problems
with basic constructors (when viewed from the perspective of approximation properties
satisfied) are issues relating to construction - empirical aspects are missed.
Definition 2.4. A property systemPagliani (2016); Pagliani and Chakraborty (2008);
Sambin (1987); Sambin and Gebellato (1999) Π is a triple of the form
〈U, P,R〉
with U being a universe of objects, P a set of properties, and R ⊆ U × P being a
manifestation relation subject to the interpretation object a has property b if and only
if (a, b) ∈ R. When P = U , then Π is said to be a square relational system and Π then
can be read as a Kripke model for a corresponding modal system.
On property systems, basic constructors that may be defined for A ⊆ U and B ⊆ P
are
< i >: ℘(U) 7−→ ℘(P ); < i > (A) = {h : (∃g ∈ A) (g, h) ∈ R} (3)
< e >: ℘(P ) 7−→ ℘(U);< e > (B) = {g : (∃h ∈ B) (g, h) ∈ R} (4)
[i] : ℘(U) 7−→ ℘(P ); [i](A) = {h : (∀g ∈ U)((g, h) ∈ R −→ g ∈ A)} (5)
[e] : ℘(P ) 7−→ ℘(U); [e](B) = {g : (∀h ∈ P )((g, h) ∈ R −→ h ∈ B)} (6)
It is known that the basic constructors may correspond to approximations under some
conditions Pagliani and Chakraborty (2008). It may hold under some other conditions.
Property system are not suitable for handling granularity and many of the inverse
problem contexts. The latter part of the statement requires some explanation because
suitability depends on the way in which the problem is posed - this has not been looked
into comprehensively in the literature.
If all the data is of the form
Object X is definitely approximated by {A1, . . . An},
with the symbols X, Ai being potentially substitutable by objects, then the data could
in principle be written in property system form with the sets of Ais forming the set
of properties P - in this situation the relation R attains a different meaning. This is
consistent with the structure being not committed to tractability of properties possessed
by objects. Granularity would also be obscure in the situation.
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If all the data is of the form
Object X ’s approximations are included in {A1, . . . An},
then the property system approach comes under even more difficulties. Granular op-
erator spaces and generalised versions thereof Mani (2016c) in contrast can handle all
this.
3. Dialectical Negation
In general rough sets, most relevant concepts of negation and implication are dialectical
in some sense. A universal definition of dialectical negation is naturally of interest - at
least one that works for the associated vague contexts. Since vagueness is everywhere,
multiple concepts of dialectical negation in the literature need to be reconciled (to the
extent possible) for the purpose of a universal definition. The main questions relating
to possible definitions of dialectical negations or contradictions at the formal level arise
from the following reasons (these are explained below):
• The consensus that dialectical logics must be logics that concern state transitions.
• The view that paraconsistent logics are essentially dialectical logics (see da Costa
and Wolf (1974)).
• The view that dialectical negation cannot be reduced to classical negation (see
Ioan (1998)). Indeed, in rough sets many kinds of negations and partial negations
have been used in the literature (see for example, Banerjee and Chakraborty
(1996); Cattaneo and Ciucci (2004); Mani (2005, 2018a); Pagliani (1998, 2000),
Cattaneo and Ciucci (2018); Cattaneo, Ciucci, and Dubois (2011); Mani (2008,
2009a, 2011); Pagliani (2016); Śle¸zak and Wasilewski (2007) and these lead to
many contradictions as in
(1) contradictions Pagliani (1998) which are not false but that represent topo-
logical boundaries;
(2) contradictions Pagliani (2000) which are not false but lie between an absolute
and local false;
(3) contradictions Pagliani (2016) which lead to at least a paraconsistent and a
paracomplete logic.
• The view that dialectical negation is glutty negation (example Brandom (2008);
Ficara (2014))- an intermediate kind of negation.
• The view that only propositional dialectical logics are possible (McGill and Parry
(1948)).
• The present author’s position that dialectical contradiction must be represented
by binary predicates or binary logical connectives in general Mani (1999, 2009b).
This is arrived at in what follows.
The relationship of an object and its negation may belong to one of three categories
(an extension of the classification in Priest (2006)):
(1) Cancellation as in the attributes do not apply. The ethical category of the negative
as used in natural language is often about this kind of cancellation. It is easy to
capture this in logics admitting different types of atomic variables (or formalised
for instance by labeled deductive systems Gabbay (1996)). In these the concept
of the Negative is usually not an atomic category. Obviously this type of negation
carries more information in being a Not This but Among Those kind of negation
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as opposed to the simple Not This, Not This and Something Else and weakenings
thereof.
(2) Complementation understood in the sense of classical logic.
(3) Glutty Version understood as something intermediate between the above two.
In general rough sets, if A is a subset of attributes and c is set complementation,
then the value of more common negations in a rough sense include Auc, Acl, Auuc, Aclu.
Each of these is a nonempty subset of Ac in general. Consequently, the corresponding
negation is glutty in a set theoretic sense.
The concept of dialectical negation as a material negation in logics about states is a
reasonable abstraction of the core concept in Hegelian and Marxist dialectics (though
this involves rejection of Hegel’s idealist position). The negation refers to concepts in
flux and so a logic with regard to the behavior of states rather than static objects
would be appropriate. According to Hegel, the world, thought and human reasoning
are dynamic and even the idea of true concepts are dynamic in nature. Poorly under-
stood concepts undergo refinement as plural concepts (with the parts being abstract
in Hegel’s sense) that assume many H(Hegelian)-Contradictory forms. After successive
refinements the resulting forms become reconciled or united as a whole. So for Hegel,
H-contradictions are essential for all life and world dynamics. But Hegel’s idealist po-
sition permitted only a closed world scheme of things. In Marx’s materialist dialectic,
the world is an open-ended system and so recursive applications of dialectical contra-
diction need not terminate or be periodic. All this means that the glutty interpretation
of Hegel’s contradiction may well be correct modulo some properties, while Marx’s idea
of dialectical contradiction does not reduce to such an interpretation in general. The
debate on endurantism and perdurantism is very relevant in the context of Hegelian
dialectics because the semantic domain associated is restricted by Hegel’s world view.
In rough semantics, especially granular ones, approximations may be seen as transitions
and so the preconditions are met in a sense.
Example 3.1. The identity of an apple on a table can be specified in a number of ways.
For the general class of apples, a set of properties X can be associated. The specific
apple in question would also be possessing a set of specific properties Z that include
the distribution and intensity of colors. Obviously, many of the specific properties will
not be true of apples in general. Further they would be in dialectical opposition to the
general. Note that an agent can have multiple views of what Z and X ought to be and
multiple agents would only contribute to the pluralism. In Hegel’s perspective all of
this dialectical contradiction must necessarily be resolved in due course (this process
may potentially involve non materialist assumptions), while in the Marxist perspective
a refined plural that may get resolved would be the result. Thus, the apple may be
of the Alice variety of Malus Domestica (a domestic apple) with many other specific
features. The schematics (for an agent) is illustrated in Fig. 1 - i is a binary predicate
with the intended meaning of being in dialectical opposition.
To see how ideas of unary operations as dialectical negations can fail, consider the
color of apples alone. If the collection of all possible colors of apples is known, then the
set of all possible colors would be knowable. Negation of a white apple may be definable
by complementation in this case. If on the other hand only a few possible sets of colors
and some collections of colors are known, then the operational definition can fail (or
lack in meaning). This justifies the use of a general binary predicate i for expressing
dialectical contradiction.
Da Costa et. al consider the heuristics of a possible dialectic logic in da Costa and
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Figure 1. Schematics of Dialectics of Identity
Wolf (1974). They seem to accept McGill’s interpretation of unity of opposites McGill
and Parry (1948) and restrict themselves to a propositional perspective on the basis
of difficulties with formalizing four of the six principles. This results in a very weak
dialectical logic. They are however of the view that formal logics based on Marxist and
Hegelian dialectics intersect the class of paraconsistent logics and there is great scope
for deviation and that it can be argued that paraconsistent logics represent a desired
amendment of dialectics because of the latter’s openness and non-rigid formalism.
The distinction between static and dynamic dialectical logics within the class of
dialectical logics with dialectical contradiction as expressed with the help of an unary
operation, may be attributed to Batens Batens (1990, 2006). Adaptive logics in that
perspective would appear to be more general than dynamic dialectical logics; the main
idea is to interpret inconsistencies as consistently as is possible. Key to this class of logics
is the concept of tolerance of contradictory statements that are not necessarily reduced in
their level of contradictions by way of proof mechanisms. Through this one can capture
parts of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis meta principle. All semantic aspects of adaptive
logics are intended in a classical perspective as opposed to dialethic logics and these are
very closely connected to paraconsistent logics as well. Some Hegelian approaches (see
Apostol (1979) for example) also seek to resolve universal contradictions.
Two of the most common misinterpretations or reductions of the concept of dialectical
opposition relate to excluding the very possibility of formalizing it and the reduction
of dialectical negation to simple negation or opposites. Examples of the latter type
are considered in Gorren (1981); Hofmann (1986). Some are of the view that Marx
worked with normative ideas of concept and so introduction of related ideas in logic are
improper. In modern terminology, Marx merely wanted concepts to be grounded in the
material and was opposed to idealist positions that were designed for supporting power
structures of oppression. This is reflected in Marx’s position on Hegel’s idealism and
also, for example, on Wagner’s position Marx and Engels (1989). Marx and Hegel did
not write about formal logic and the normative ideas of concept used by both and other
authors during the time can be found in great numbers. From the point of view of less
normative (or non normative) positions all these authors implicitly developed concepts
at all times. It is also a reasonable position that Marxist methodologies should not
be formalised independently of the normative restriction on possible ideas of concept
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afforded by actualization contexts. This is because it is always a good idea to have good
grounding axioms for concepts to the extent that is permitted/possible by the context
in question.
In the present author’s opinion for a methodology or theory to qualify as dialectic
in Marx’s sense it is necessary that the idea of concepts used should be well grounded
in the actualization contexts of the methodology or theory. In the context of reasoning
with vagueness and rough sets, this may amount to requiring the approach be granular
under specific conditions.
In general, formal versions of dialectical logics can be based on some of the following
principles/heuristics.
A Binary Logical predicates (that admit of universal substitution by propositional vari-
ables and well formed formulas) that are intended to signify binary dialectical
contradiction are necessary for dialectical logics,
B Unary logical connectives (that admit of universal substitution by propositional vari-
ables and well formed formulas) suffice for expressing dialectical contradiction,
C The thesis-antithesis-synthesis principles must necessarily be included in the form of
rules in any dialectical logic,
E Higher order quantifiers must be used in the logical formalism in an essential way
because dialectical contradictions happen between higher order concepts,
F Dialectical logics should be realizable as fragments of first order predicate logic - this
view is typically related to the position that higher order logics are superfluous.
G Dialectical contradiction in whatever representation must be present at each stage
of what is defined to constitute dialectical derivation - this abstraction is due to
the present author and is not hard to realise.
H All dialectic negations should be dialethic(*) in nature - this is a possibility ex-
plored in Priest (2006). Dialethias are statements that can be both true and false
simultaneously
I A logic that permits expression of progression of knowledge states is a dialectical
logic.
J a first order logic perspective
K the point of view that dialectical contradiction can be expressed by binary predicates
and not by unary operations
L Dialectical logics as paraconsistent logics incorporating contradictions or as inconsis-
tency adaptive logics.
Obviously many of these are mutually incompatible. [K] in particular is incompatible
with [B] in the above. [I] leads to linear logics and variants. The meaning of dialectical
logics that admit representation as a fragment of first order predicate logic will be
naturally restricted. A few versions are known. Dynamic dialectical logics have been
developed as inconsistency adaptive logics by Batens Batens (1989) in particular. In
the present paper, [A] will be preferred as the binary predicate/predication cannot
always be reduced to unary negations.
In general, it is obvious that given a dynamically changing subject, there will be
at least a set of things which are dialectically contradictory to it in many ways. If a
is in dialectical contradiction to b and c in two different senses, then it is perfectly
possible that b is dialectically contradictory to c in some other sense. Further if X is
dialectically contradictory to a conjunction of the form Y ∧ Z, then it is possible that
X is dialectically contradictory to Y in some other sense and is virtually indifferent to
Z.
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3.1. Dialectical Contradiction and Contradiction
At a more philosophical level, the arguments of this section can be expressed in the
language of functors Ioan (1998). However, a set-theoretic semantic approach is better
suited for the present purposes. The concepts of contradiction and dialethic contra-
diction make essential use of negation operations (in some general sense), while that
of dialectical contradiction when formulated on comparable terms does not necessarily
require one. It is necessary to clarify the admissible negations in all this as many vari-
ations of the concept of logical negation are known and most are relevant for rough set
contexts.
Let S be a partially ordered set with at least one extra partial unary operation
f , a least element ⊥ and a partial order ≤ (∧, ∨ being partial lattice infimum and
supremum). In a partial algebra, two terms p and q, are weakly equal, (p ω= q), if and
only if whenever both terms are defined then they are equal. Consider the following :
x ∧ f(x) ω= ⊥ (N1)
(x ≤ y −→ f(y) ≤ f(x)) (N2)
x ≤ f2(x) (N3)
(x ≤ f(y) −→ y ≤ f(x)) (N4)
fn(x) = fn+m(x) for some minimal n,m ∈ N (N5)
f(x ∨ y) ω= f(x) ∧ f(y) (N6)
x ∧ y = ⊥ ↔ y ≤ f(x). (N9)
Distinct combinations of these non-equivalent conditions can characterise negations.
In Tzouvaras (2001), if an operation satisfies N1 and N2 over a distributive lattice,
then it is taken to be a general negation. This is a reasonable concept for logics dealing
with exact information alone as N1 does not hold in the algebras of vague logics, un-
certain or approximate reasoning. For example it fails in the algebras of rough logic and
generalizations thereof Banerjee and Chakraborty (1996); Mani (2008, 2012b, 2016a).
If ∀x fm(x) = fn(x) holds, then the least n such that m < n is called the global
period of f , s = n − m, the global pace of f and (m, n), the index of f .
Theorem 3.2. When the poset is a distributive lattice in the above context, then the
following are separately true:
(1) If f satisfies N1 and N2, then the index (0, n) for n > 2 is not possible.
(2) If f satisfies N1, N2, and N3, then f(⊥) = T is the greatest element of the
lattice and f(T ) = ⊥.
(3) N1, N2, N3 together do not imply N9
(4) N9 implies each of N1, N2 and N3.
(5) An interior operator i on a poset is one that satisfies
• i(x) ≤ x,
• (a ≤ b −→ i(a) ≤ i(b))
• i(i(x)) = i(x).
If f is a regular negation (that is it satisfies the conditions N1, N2 and N3) and
i an interior operator, then g = if is a negation that satisfies g4 = g2
Even at these levels of generality, the generalised negations can fail to express the
appropriate concept of dialectical contradiction.
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In a set-theoretical perspective, if a set of things A is dialectically opposed to another
set B, then it may appear reasonable to expect A to contain the set of things dialectically
opposed to B. Subject to this intent, the set of all things dialectically opposed to A
would need to be expressed by ∼ A. But in dialectical reasoning it will still be reasonable
to say that A is dialectically opposed to some part of ∼ A. For this the use of a unary
∼ can be glaringly insufficient. This is true not only from an algebraic system point of
view (when working within a model) but also from perspectives generated by admissible
sets of models. N2 is inherently incompatible with accepting f as a unary dialectical
negation operator, especially when a lattice order is expected to be induced by some
concept of logical equivalence from the order. N3 is perhaps the most necessary property
of a dialectical negation operation.
Well-formed formulas of certain derived types alone may admit of a negation (in the
sense of being equivalent to one of the negatives). Such a negation is partial. For instance,
∼∼ x may not be defined in the first place, and some of N1 − N9 may hold for such
negations. Using such types of negation for expressing dialectical contradictions through
compound constructions may be possible in adequately labeled deductive systems.
Dialethic logics are logics that tolerate contradictions and accept true contradictions.
To be more specific a dialetheia is a pair of statements having the form A & ¬A with
each of A and ¬A being true. These statements may be interpreted sentences expressed
in some language (that may be natural language or a language of thought, or anything).
They can be used to formalize only some restricted cases of dialectical reasoning in which
a unary dialectical contradiction operation is possible. It is also possible to reformulate
some dialectical contexts as a dialethic process. Priest Priest (1999) had indicated the
possibility of using dialethic logics as a base for dialectic logics. In Priest (1984), Priest
develops a dialectical tense logic, where it is possible for a system to exist in both pre and
post states during (at the instant of) state transitions. Zeleny Zeleny (1994) in particular
has correctly pointed out (from a philosophical perspective) the possible shortcomings of
a unary negation based approach. Though the issue of desiring incompatibility between
classical logic and a possible dialectical logic is not a justified heuristic. The essential
dialetheism principle is however usable in dialectical derivations. Such situations would
allow dialectical opposition between proof patterns naturally.
The nature and meaning of negation in a dialethic logic is explained in Priest (1999,
2007). From a philosophical meta perspective the negation of a formula is possibly
a collection of formulas that may be represented by a single formula (from a logical
perspective). It is with respect to such a negation that dialethic logics must tolerate
contradictions and accept true ones. A survey of concepts of contradictions for dialethe-
ism can also be found in Grim (2007). Using any kind of universal paraconsistent system
for describing inconsistencies is virtually shown to be an undesirable approach in Batens
(1990). Marxist dialectics is perceived from a dialetheistic perspective of things in Woods
(2004). It is claimed that dialetheias correspond to and realise the concept of historical
contradiction. The methodological aspect of Marxist dialectics is also ignored by Priest
(see Priest (1990)) to the point that dialectic is a dialetheia. There are no methodolog-
ical strictures associated with dialetheias except for the requirement that they be real.
This approach ignores
• the world view associated with Hegelian-Marxist dialectics,
• the principle of unity of opposites, and
• the basic problem with formalizing dialectical opposition with a unary operator -
this is because the negation in dialectics is transient and dependent on the above
two points.
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In the present author’s view dialetheias do exist in the real world and they may be
the result of
• missing data/information
• a deliberate disregard for consistency. For example, a large number of people in
the news media, religion and politics practice dialethic expression of a crude form
and deceit. They may have their motivations for such actions, but those would
not be justification for their dialetheias. It may also be possible to construct
equivalent models or models with additional information that do not have true
contradictions. For example, the statement X has property Q and ¬Q may be
replaced by the statements X has property Q in state A and X has property
¬Q in state B. This amounts to interfering with the data and does not really
change the state of affairs. Many religious functionaries have been convicted of
sexual crimes and most were in harmony with their apparent dialethic behavior
(religious texts may be full of contradictions, that only allows for prolonging the
derivations).
The present author agrees with Priest’s claims about dialetheias being not resolvable
by revision of concepts and that they are better handled as such Priest (1990, 2006,
2014). However, she does not agree at all that the proper way of formalizing Hegelian-
Marxist dialectics in all cases is through dialetheias. A mathematical formulation of the
issue for many sub cases may be possible through rough sets. The Cold vs Influenza
example considered in the subsection on examples of parthoods throws much light on
the matter.
3.2. Dialectical Predication
At a philosophic level, dialectical predication is a relation between functors in the sense
of Ioan (1998). At a formal model-theoretic semantic level, the best realization is through
a binary dialectical predicate i, that may have limited connections with negation oper-
ations (if any). The basic properties that are necessary (not sufficient) of the predicate
are as follows (with ⊕ standing for aggregation):
i(a, b)←→ i(b, a) (Commutativity)
¬i(a, a) (Anti-Reflexivity)
i(a, b) −→ i(a⊕ c, b⊕ c) (Aggregation)
This predicate may be related to unary dialectical negation operations in a simple or
complex way. One possibility (that leads to N4) is the following (for two predicates P
and Q):
i(a, b) iff P (a) =⇒ ¬Q(b)
That the definitions are important is illustrated by the following example.
Let {xn} be a sequence of real numbers. In contexts where reasoning proceeds from
the concrete to a general, let
• A be the statement that Limit of the sequence is not conceivable
• B be the statement that Statement A is conceivable
• C be the statement that As B is true, the limit of the sequence is conceivable.
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A is dialectically opposed to C, but the scenario does not amount to a dialetheia if the
entire context has enough information of the process (of B being true) being referred
to by C.
Example 3.3 (Dialectics from Classification). The intent of this example is to show
that
• strategies for classification of information can be dialectically opposed to each
other and
• such information can fit into the rough set paradigm without the involvement of
dialetheias.
From an abstract perspective, consider a general process or phenomena C described
in abstract terms A1, . . . , Af . Let every extension of the process have additional peculiar
properties that lead to not necessarily independent classifications C1, C2, . . . , Cn. Also
let the categories C∗1 , C∗2 , . . . , C∗r be formed by way of interaction between the members
of said classes. This scenario leads to instances of parthood like PA1C1 and PC1C∗1 with
PC1C∗1 being in dialectical opposition to PA1C1. Concrete instances of development
over these lines are easy to find. In fact the historical development of any subject in the
social sciences that has witnessed significant improvement over the last thirty years or
so would fit under this schema. Two diverse contexts where such a dynamics may be
envisioned are presented next.
Models and methods used for income estimation of rural agrarian households manage
agrarian relations in different ways Swaminathan and Rawal (2015). Long term ground
level studies are required to clarify the nature of these relations. Suppose C is about
estimating poverty in a village and A1, A2, A3 are abstract categories based on volume
of monetary transaction by farmers. Some economists may use this for estimating net
income and as an indicator of absence of poverty, while in reality farmers may be having
negative income or the sources may not be reliable.
Suppose, an improved classification C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 has been arrived at based on
estimates of investment, expenditure, consumption, exchange of labor and other factors
through ground level studies. The resultant classification may need to be improved fur-
ther to take non monetary transactions like barter of goods and resources into account.
Thus, C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 may be arrived at.
C1 definitely takes A1 into account and the latter is a causative factor for the former.
This can be expressed by the parthood PA1C1. C1 is a much stronger causative factor
of C∗1 . PC1C∗1 then is dialectically opposed to PA1C1. Such a relation can be used to
track the context dynamics.
The subject of lesbian sexuality in particular has progressed significantly over the
last few decades and can be expressed in similar abstract perspectives (see Zimmerman
(2000) and more recent literature). Women love women in different ways and this varia-
tion is significant for sub-classification. The parameters of classification relate to gender
expression, sexual state variation, sexual performance, preferences in sexual interac-
tion, routines, mutual communication, lifestyle choices, related social communication
and more.
4. Dialectical Rough Sets
A dialectical approach to rough sets was introduced and a more general program was
formulated in Mani (2009b) by the present author. Multiple kinds of roughly equivalent
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objects and the dialectical relation between them are stressed in the approach. This is
reflected in the two algebraic logics proposed in the mentioned paper. The entire universe
is taken to be a dialectical relation in the second semantics and possible derivations
revolve around it. The main intent was to include mixed kinds of objects in the semantics
and so ideas of contamination apply differently. The essential content is repeated below
(as Mani (2009b) is a conference paper) and the nature of some possible parthoods
involved is defined below.
A pre-rough algebra Banerjee and Chakraborty (1996) is an algebra having the form
S = 〈S,u,unionsq,⇒, L,¬, 0, 1〉
of type (2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0), which satisfies:
• 〈S,u,unionsq,¬〉 is a De Morgan lattice.
• ¬¬a = a ; L(a) u a = L(a)
• L(a unionsq b) = L(a) unionsq L(b) ; ¬L¬L(a) = L(a)
• LL(a) = L(a) ; L(1) = 1 ; L(a u b) = L(a) u L(b) ; ¬L(a) unionsq L(a) = 1
• If L(a)uL(b) = L(a) and ¬L(¬(a u b)) = ¬L(¬a) then a u b = a. This is actually
a quasi equation.
• a⇒ b = (¬L(a) unionsq L(b)) u (L(¬a) unionsq ¬L(¬b)).
A completely distributive pre-rough algebra is called a rough algebra. In all these alge-
bras it is possible to define an operation  by setting (x) = ¬L¬(x) for each element
x.
It should be noted that above definition has superfluous conditions. An equivalent
definition that was used in Mani (2018a) (based on Saha, Sen, and Chakraborty (2015))
is the following:
Definition 4.1. An essential pre-rough algebra is an algebra of the form
E = 〈E,u, L,¬, 0, 1〉
that satisfies the following (with unionsq being a defined by (∀a, b) a unionsq b = ¬(¬a u ¬b) and
a ≤ b being an abbreviation for a u b = a.)
〈E,u,unionsq,¬, 0, 1〉 is a quasi Boolean algebra.
E1 L1 = 1
E2 (∀a)La u a = La
E3 (∀a, b)L(a u b) = L(a) u L(b)
E4 (∀a)¬L¬La = La
E5 (∀a)¬La u La = 0
E6 (∀a, b) (¬L¬a ≤ ¬L¬b & La ≤ Lb −→ a ≤ b)
An essential pre-rough algebra is said to be an essential rough algebra if L(E) is also
complete and completely distributive- that is it satisfies (for any subset X and element
a)
a unionsq (
l
X) =
l
{a unionsq x : x ∈ X} & a u (
⊔
X) =
⊔
{a u x : x ∈ X}
Essential pre-rough algebras are categorically equivalent to pre-rough algebras and
essential rough algebras to rough algebras.
In this semantics explicit interaction between objects in the rough semantic domain
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and entities in the classical semantic domain is permitted. The requirement of explicit
interaction is naturally tied to objects having a dual nature in the relatively hybrid
semantic domain. Consequently an object’s existence has dialectical associations. In
application contexts, this approach can also be useful in enriching the interaction within
the rough semantic domain with additional permissible information from the classical
semantic domain.
Suppose S1, S2, S3, and S4 are four general approximation spaces. Suppose that the
semantics of S2 relative to S1 and S4 relative to S3 are definable in a semantic domain.
The question of equivalence of these relativizations is relevant. It may be noted that
the essential problem is implicit in Mani (2012b). The hybrid dialectical approach is
relevant in these contexts. But of course, this approach is not intended to be compatible
with contamination.
In rough algebra semantics it is not possible to keep track of the evolution of rough
objects relative to the classical semantics suggested by the Boolean algebra with ap-
proximation operators. Conversely in the latter it is not possible to form rough unions
and rough intersections relative to the rough algebra semantics. These are examples of
relative distortions. The CERA semantics (concrete enriched pre-rough algebra), which
is developed in the next subsection can deal with this, but distortions relative to super
rough semantics (Mani (2005)) are better dealt with CRAD (concrete rough dialectical
algebra introduced in the last subsection) like methods. For more on these consider-
ations, the reader is referred to Mani (2012b) and in the three-valued perspective to
Pagliani (1998, 2000). In Pagliani (2000), a three-valued sub domain and a classic sub
domain formed by the union of the singleton granules of the classification are identified
within the rough domain itself.
Jaskowski’s discursive logic is an example of a subvaluationary approach in that it
retains the non truth of contradictions in the face of truth-gluts. Connections with pre-
rough, rough algebras and rough logics are well known (see Banerjee, Chakraborty, and
Bunder (2008)). In particular, Pawlak’s five valued rough logic Rl (see Pawlak (1987))
and LR (Banerjee et al. (2008)) are not dialethic: though it is possible to know that
something is roughly true and roughly false at the same time, it is taken to be roughly
inconsistent as opposed to being just true or roughly true. This rejection definitely leads
to rejection of other reasoning that leads to it as conclusion. Importantly a large set of
logics intended for capturing rough semantics are paraconsistent and make use of skewed
forms of conjunction and disjunction. It can be argued that the latter feature is sugges-
tive of incomplete development of the logics due to inconsistencies in the application
of the underlying philosophy (see Hyde and Colyvan (2008) for example). The 4-valued
DDT (see Tzouvaras (2001)) addresses some of these concerns with a justification for
3-valuedness in some semantics of classical RST. The NMatrix based logic (Avron and
Konikowska (2008)) provides a different solution by actually avoiding conjunction and
disjunction operations (it should, however, be noted that conjunctions and disjunctions
are definable operations in the NMatrix based logic). In super rough semantics, due to
the present author Mani (2005), the ability of objects to approximate is called in. These
concerns become more acute in the semantics of more general rough sets.
In summary, the main motivations for the approach of this section are
• to provide a framework for investigating relative distortions introduced by different
theories - this is in sharp contrast to the contamination reduction approach Mani
(2005, 2012b) of the present author,
• to improve the interface between rough and classical semantic domains in appli-
cation contexts,
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• to investigate relativization of semantics in the multi source general rough contexts
(or equivalently in the general dynamic approximation contexts) - in Mani (2013)
a distinct semantic approach to the problem is developed by the present author,
• address issues relating to truth and parthood at the semantic level,
• and develop a dialectical logic of rough semantics.
The nature of parthood was not considered in the context by the present author at
the time of writing Mani (2009b). It is considered here to specify the nature of dialectical
oppositions and potential diagrams of opposition.
4.1. Enriched Classical Rough Set Theory
Let S = 〈S, R〉 be an approximation space with S being a set and R an equivalence.
S will be used interchangeably with S and the intended meaning should be clear from
the context. If A ⊂ S, Al = ⋃{[x] ; [x] ⊆ A} and Au = ⋃{[x] ; [x] ∩ A 6= ∅} are the
lower and upper approximation of A respectively. If A, B ∈ ℘(S), then A is roughly
equal to B (A ≈ B) if and only if Al = Bl and Au = Bu. [A] shall be the equivalence
class (with respect to ≈) formed by a A ∈ ℘(S).
The proposed model may be seen as an extension of the pre-rough and rough algebra
models in Banerjee and Chakraborty (1996). Here the base set is taken to be ℘(S) ∪
℘(S)| ≈ as opposed to ℘(S)| ≈ (used in the construction of a rough set algebra). The
new operations ⊕, and  introduced below are correspond to generalised aggregation
and commonality respectively in the mixed domain. This is not possible in classical
rough sets proper.
Definition 4.2. On Y = ℘(S) ∪ ℘(S)| ≈, the operations L, ⊕, , ,  , , ∼ are
defined as follows: (it is assumed that the operations ∪, ∩, c, l, u and unionsq, u, L, M, ¬, ⇒
are available on ℘(S) and ℘(S)| ≈ respectively. Further
τ1x⇔ x ∈ ℘(S) and τ2x⇔ x ∈ ℘(S)| ≈ .
•
Lx =
{
xl if τ1x
Lx if τ2x
•
x =
{
xu if τ1x
¬L¬x if τ2x
•
x⊕ y =

x ∪ y if τ1x, τ1y[
x ∪ (⋃z ∈ y z)] if τ1x, τ2y
[(
⋃
z ∈x z) ∪ y] if τ2x, τ1y
x unionsq y if τ2x, τ2y
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•x y =

x ∩ y if τ1x, τ1y[
x ∩ (⋂z ∈ y z)] if τ1x, τ2y
[(
⋂
z ∈x z) ∩ y] if τ2x, τ1y
x u y if τ2x, τ2y
•
∼ x =
{
xc if τ1x
¬x if τ2x
•
x y =

x ∪ yc if τ1x, τ1y[⋃
z ∈ y(x ∪ zc)
]
if τ1x, τ2y
x =⇒ y if τ2x, τ2y
[
⋃
z ∈x(z ∪ yc)] if τ2x, τ1y
•
x y =

[x ∪ yc] if τ1x, τ1y[⋃
z ∈ y(x ∪ zc)
]
if τ1x, τ2y
x =⇒ y if τ2x, τ2y
[
⋃
z ∈x(z ∪ yc)] if τ2x, τ1y
It should be noted that  is a very restrictive operation (because the commonality
is over a class) when one of the argument is of type τ1 and the other is of type τ2. An
alternative is to replace it with ◦ defined by the Eqn.7.
x ◦ a =

x ∩ a if τ1x, τ1a
[x ∩ (⋃z ∈ a z)] if τ1x, τ2a
[(
⋃
z ∈x z) ∩ a] if τ2x, τ1a
x u a if τ2x, τ2a
(7)
Definition 4.3. In the above context a partial algebra of the form
W =
〈
℘(S) ∪ ℘(S)| ≈, ¬, ∼, ⊕, , , L, 0, 1, ⊥, >
〉
of type (1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) is a concrete enriched pre-rough algebra
(CERA) if a pre-rough algebra structure is induced on ℘(S)| ≈. Concrete enriched rough
algebras can be defined in the same manner. If the approximation space is X, then the
derived CERA will be denoted byW(X). Note that the two implication-like operations
are definable in terms of other basic functions. A CERA in which  has been replaced
by ◦ is said to be a soft CERA.
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Proposition 4.4. CERAs are well defined because of the representation theory of pre-
rough algebras.
Theorem 4.5. A CERA satisfies all the following: (The first two conditions essentially
state that the τis are abbreviations)
(x x = > ←→ τ1x) (type-1)
(¬x = ¬x←→ τ2x) (type-2)
∼∼ x = x; LLx = Lx; Lx = Lx (ov-1)
Lx⊕ x = x; Lx x = Lx; x⊕ x = x; x x = x (ov-2)
Lx = x; x⊕ x = x; x x = x (ov-3)
(τ1x −→∼ x⊕ x = >); (τ2x −→∼ Lx⊕ Lx = 1) (qov-1)
∼ ⊥ = >; ∼ 0 = 1 (qov-2)
x⊕ (x⊕ (x⊕ y)) = x⊕ (x⊕ y); x (x (x y)) = x (x y) (u1)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x; x y = y  x (u2)
(τix, τiy, τiz −→ x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z); i = 1, 2 (ter(i1))
(τix, τiy, τiz −→ x⊕ (y  z) = (x⊕ y) (x⊕ z)); i = 1, 2 (ter(i2)
(τix, τiy, τiz −→ x (y  z) = (x y) z); i = 1, 2 (ter(i3)
(τix, τiy −→ x⊕ (x y) = x,∼ (x y) =∼ x⊕ ∼ y); i = 1, 2 (bi(i))
(τ1x, τ2y, x⊕ y = y −→ x⊕ y = y) (bm)
(τ1x, (1 x = y) ∨ (y = x⊕ 0) −→ τ2y) (hra1)
Definition 4.6. An abstract enriched pre-rough partial algebra (AERA) will be a partial
algebra of the form
S = 〈S, ¬, ∼, ⊕, , , L, 0, 1, ⊥, >〉
(of type (1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)) that satisfies:
RA dom(¬) along with the operations (⊕, , , L, ∼, 0, 1) restricted to it and the
definable ⇒ forms a pre-rough algebra,
BA S \ dom(¬) with the operations (⊕, , , L, ∼, >, ⊥) restricted to it forms a
topological boolean algebra (with an interior and closure operator),
IN Given the definitions of type-1, type-2, all of u1, u2, ter(ij), bi(i), bm and hra hold
for any i, j.
Note that AERAs are actually defined by a set of quasi equations.
Theorem 4.7. Every AERA S has an associated approximation space X (up to iso-
morphism), such that the derived CERA W(X) is isomorphic to it.
Proof. Given S, the topological boolean algebra and the pre-rough algebra part can
be isolated as the types can be determined with ¬, ⊕ and the 0-place operations. The
representation theorems for the parts can be found in Rasiowa (1974) and Banerjee and
Chakraborty (1996) respectively.
SupposeW(Y ) is a CERA formed from the approximation space Y (say) determined
by the two parts. If Y is not isomorphic to X as a relational structure, then it is possible
to derive an easy contradiction to the representation theorem of the parts.
SupposeW(X) is not isomorphic to S, then given the isomorphisms between respec-
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tive parts, at least one instance of x⊕′ y 6= x⊕ y or x′ y 6= x y (for a type-1 x and
a type-2 y with ′ denoting the interpretation in W(X)). But as type-1 elements can be
mapped into type-2 elements (using 0 and ⊕), this will result in a contradiction to the
representation theorem of parts.
4.2. Dialectical Rough Logic
A natural dialectical interpretation can be assigned to the proposed semantics. A subset
of the original approximation space has a dual interpretation in the classical and rough
semantic domain. While an object in the latter relates to a set of objects in the classical
semantic domain, it is not possible to transform objects in the rough domain to the
former. For this reason, the universe is taken to be the set of tuples having the form
{(x, 0⊕ x) : τ1x} ∪ {(b, x) : τ2b & τ1x & x⊕ 0 = b} = K (x and b being elements of
a CERA). This universe is simply the described dialectical relation between objects in
the two domains mentioned above. Other dialectical relations can also be derived from
the specified one.
Definition 4.8. A concrete rough dialectical algebra (CRAD) will be a partial
algebra on K along with the operations +, ·, L∗, ¬, ∼ and 0-place operations
(>, 1), (1, >), (0, ⊥), (⊥, 0) defined by (EUD is an abbreviation for Else Undefined)
(a, b) + (c, e) =

(a⊕ c, b⊕ e) if τia, τic if defined
(a⊕ c, e⊕ a) if τ1a, τ2c, (e⊕ a)⊕ 0 = a⊕ c, EUD
(a⊕ e, c⊕ b) if τ2a, τ1c, (c⊕ b)⊕ 0 = a⊕ e, EUD
(a, b) · (c, e) =

(a c, b e) if τia, τic if defined
(a c, e a) if τ1a, τ2c, (e a) 0 = a c, EUD
(a e, c b) if τ2a, τ1c, (c b) 0 = a e, EUD
L∗(a, b) = (La, Lb) if defined and ∼ (a, b) = (∼ a, ∼ b) if defined.
Illustrative Example
The following example is intended to illustrate key aspects of the theory invented in
this section.
Let S = {a, b, c, e, f, q} and R be the least equivalence relation generated by
{(a, b), (b, c), (e, f)}.
Under the conditions, the partition corresponding to the equivalence is
G = {{a, b, c}, {e, f}, {q}}.
The quotient S|R is the same as G. In this example strings having the form ef are used
as an abbreviation for {e, f}.
The set of triples having the form (x, xl, xu) for any x ∈ ℘(S) is as below:
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• (a, ∅, abc), (b, ∅, abc), (c, ∅, abc), (e, ∅, ef),
• (f, ∅, ef), (q, q, q), (ab, ∅, abc), (ac, ∅, abc),
• (ae, ∅, abcef), (af, ∅, abcef), (aq, q, abcq), (bc, ∅, abc),
• (be, ∅, abcef), (bf, ∅, abcef), (bq, q, abcq), (ec, ∅, abcef),
• (cf, ∅, abcef), (ef, ef, ef), (eq, q, efq), (fq, q, efq), (abc, abc, abc),
• (abe, ∅, abcef), (abf, ∅, abcef), (abq, q, abcq), (bce, ∅, abcef),
• (bcf, ∅, abcef), (bcq, q, abcq), (ace, ∅, abcef), (acf, ∅, abcef),
• (acq, q, abcq), (aef, ef, abcef), (bef, ef, abcef), (cef, ef, abcef),
• (aeq, q, S), (afq, q, S), (beq, q, S), (bfq, q, S), (ceq, q, S),
• (cfq, q, S), (efq, efq, efq), (abce, abc, abcef), (abcf, abc, abcef),
• (abcq, abcq, abcq), (abef, ef, abcef), (abeq, q, S), (abfq, q, S),
• (bcef, ef, abcef), (bceq, q, S), (bcfq, q, S), (aceq, q, S), (acfq, q, S),
• (acef, ef, abcef), (aefq, efq, S), (befq, efq, S), (cefq, efq, S),
• (abcef, abcef, abcef), (abceq, abcq, S), (abcfq, abcq, S), (acefq, efq, S),
• (bcefq, efq, S), (S, S, S)
From the values, it can be checked that the sets of roughly equivalent objects are
• {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}, {e, f}, {q} - the reader should note that elements belonging to
the set are themselves sets.
• {ae, af, be, bf, ce, cf, abe, ace, acf, abf, bce, bcf}
• {abq, acq, bcq, aq, bq, cq}, {abce, abcf}, {aef, bef, cef, abef, acef, bcef}
• {eq, fq}, {abc}, {abcef}, {ef}, {abcq}, {efq}, S
• {aeq, beq, ceq, afq, bfq, cfq, abeq, aceq, bceq, abfq, bcfq, acfq}
• {aefq, befq, cefq, abefq, bcefq, acefq} and {abceq, abcfq}.
The domain is taken to be ℘(S) ∪ ℘(S)|R in case of a CERA and interpretations of
the unary operations are obvious. The nontrivial binary operations get interpreted as
below :
bc⊕ [bf ] = [bc ∪ abcef ] = [abcef ]
b⊕ [f ] = [bef ] = {aef, bef, cef, abef, acef, bcef}
bc [bf ] =
[
bc ∩
⋂
{ae, af, be, bf, ce, cf, abe, ace, acf, abf, bce, bcf}
]
= [∅]
b [f ] = [b ∩
⋂
{e, f}] = [∅]
abcq  [q] = [q]
bc [bf ] =
 ⋃
z ∈ [bf ]
(bc ∪ zc)
 = S
bc [abceq] = {abcef}
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bc [S] = {a, b, c, ab, bc, ac}
[bf ] bc =
 ⋃
z ∈ [bf ]
(z ∪ bcc)
 = [S]
The universe of the CRAD associated with a CERA S is formed as the set of pairs
having the form (x, 0⊕ x) and (x⊕ 0, x) under the restriction that τ1x holds. So in the
present example, some elements belonging to the universe are (a, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}),
({a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}, bc), (fq, {eq, fq}).
(a, b) + (c, e) =

(a⊕ c, b⊕ e) if τia, τic
(a⊕ c, e⊕ a) if τ1a, τ2c, (e⊕ a)⊕ 0 = a⊕ c, EUD
(a⊕ e, c⊕ b) if τ2a, τ1c, (c⊕ b)⊕ 0 = a⊕ e, EUD
To compute (a, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}) + ({eq, fq}, fq) it is necessary to compute
• a⊕ {eq, fq} = {aefq, befq, cefq, abefq, bcefq, acefq}
• a⊕ fq = afq
• afq + 0 = {aeq, beq, ceq, afq, bfq, cfq, abeq, aceq, bceq, abfq, bcfq, acfq}
• Clearly, a⊕ {eq, fq} 6= afq + 0.
• So (a, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}) + ({eq, fq}, fq) is not defined.
Also note that (a, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}) + (b, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}) is defined, but
(a, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}) + (bc, {a, b, c, ab, ac, bc}) is not.
4.2.0.1. Dialectical Negations in Practice. Real examples can be constructed
(from the above example) by assigning meaning to the elements of S. An outline is
provided below.
• Suppose {a, b, c, e, f, q} is a set of attributes of lawn tennis players.
• For the above sentence to fit into the example context, it is necessary that they
can be freely collectivised. This means that no combination of attributes should
be explicitly forbidden.
• While sets of the form ec refer to players with specific attributes, roughly equal ob-
jects like {aef, bef, cef, abef, acef, bcef} can be read as new class labels. Members
of a class can be referred to in multiple ways.
• The operations defined permit aggregation, commonality and implications in novel
ways. The ⊕ operation in particular can generate new classes that contain classes
of roughly equal players and players with specific attributes in a mereological
sense. For example, it can answer questions of the form: What features can be
expected of those who have a great backhand and have roughly equal performance
on hard courts?
• A number of dialectical negations can be defined in the situation. For example,
◦ An object x is in a sense dialectically opposed to a roughly equivalent set of
objects H.
◦ An object x is in a sense dialectically opposed to x⊕H.
◦ Likewise other operations defined provide more examples of opposition.
More generally, similar dialectical negation predicates can be defined over CRADs and
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new kinds of logical rules can be specified that concern transformation of one instance
of dialectical negation into another, restricted introduction and inference rules. Related
logic will appear separately.
4.3. Parthoods
In CERA related contexts, the universe is taken to beW = ℘(S) ∪ ℘(S)| ≈ and the most
natural parthoods are ones defined from the aggregation and commonality operators.
Parthoods can also be based on information content and ideas of consistent comparison.
Definition 4.9. The following parthoods can be defined in the mixed semantic domain
corresponding to CERA on W
Poab ↔ [a] ≤ [b] (Roughly Consistent)
P⊕ab ↔ a⊕ b = b (Additive)
Pab ↔ a b = a (Common)
≤ is the lattice order used in the definition of pre-rough algebras. Note that the
operations ⊕, are not really required in the definitions of the last two parthoods
which can equivalently be defined using the associated cases. This is significant as one
of the goals is to count the objects in specialised ways to arrive at semantics that make
sense Mani (2012b).
In the definition of the base set K of CRAD, K is already a dialectic relation. Still
definitions of parthoods over it make sufficient sense.
Definition 4.10. The relation Pℵ, defined as below, will be called the natural parthood
relation on K:
Pℵab↔ [e1a] ≤ [e1b] & [e2a] ≤ [e2b],
where the operation ei gives the ith component for i = 1, 2.
Admittedly the above definition is not internal to K as it refers to things that do not
exist within K at the object level of reasoning.
5. General Parthood
Parthood can be defined in various ways in the framework of rough sets in general and
granular operator spaces in particular. The rough inclusion defined earlier in the back-
ground section is a common example of parthood. Some others have been introduced
in Def.4.9 and in the illustrative example. The following are more direct possibilities
that refer to a single non classical semantic domain (the parthoods of CERA are in the
classical domain):
27
Pab←→ al ⊆ bl (Very Cautious)
Pab←→ al ⊆ bu (Cautious)
Pab←→ al ⊆ bu \ bl (Lateral)
Pab←→ au ⊆ bu (Possibilist)
Pab←→ au ⊆ bl (Ultra Cautious)
Pab←→ au ⊆ bu \ bl (Lateral+)
Pab←→ au \ al ⊆ bu \ bl (Bilateral)
Pab←→ au \ al ⊆ bl (Lateral++)
Pab←→ (∀g ∈ G)(g ⊆ a −→ g ⊆ b) (G-Simple)
All these are valid concepts of parthoods that make sense in contexts as per availabil-
ity and nature of information. Very cautious parthood makes sense in contexts with high
cost of misclassification or the association between properties and objects is confounded
by the lack of clarity in the possible set of properties. G-Simple is a version that refers
granules alone and avoids references to approximations.
The above mentioned list of parthoods can be more easily found in decision making
contexts in practice.
Example 5.1. Consider, for example, the nature of diagnosis and treatment of patients
in a hospital in war torn Aleppo in the year 2016. The situation was characterised
by shortage of medical personnel, damaged infrastructure, large number of patients
and possibility of additional damage to infrastructure. Suppose patient B has bone
fractures and a bullet embedded in their arm and patient C has bone fractures and
shoulder dislocation due to a concrete slab in free fall, that only one doctor is on duty,
and suppose that either of the two patients can be treated properly due to resource
constraints. Suppose also that the doctor in question has access to some precise and
unclear diagnostic information on medical conditions and that all of this data is not in
tabular form.
In the situation, decision making can be based on available information and principles
like
• Allocate resources to the patient who is definitely in the worst state - this decision
strategy can be corresponded to very cautious parthoods,
• Allocate resources to the patient who seems to be in the worst state - this decision
strategy can be corresponded to cautious parthoods,
• Allocate resources to the patient who is possibly in the worst state - this decision
strategy can be corresponded to possibilist parthoods.
• Allocate resources to the patient who is likely to show more than the default
amount of improvement - this decision strategy can be corresponded to the bilat-
eral parthoods.
• If every symptom or unit complication that is experienced or certainly likely to be
experienced by patient 1 is also experienced or is certainly likely to be experienced
by patient 2, then prefer treating patient 2 over patient 1 - this decision strategy
can be corresponded to the g-simple parthoods with symptoms/unit complications
as granules.
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Parthood can be associated with both dialectic and dialethic statements in a number
of ways. Cautious parthood is consistent with instances having the form Pab and Pba.
It is by itself a dialectic relation within the same domain of discourse. Dialectics between
parthoods in different semantic domains are of greater interest and will be considered
in subsequent sections.
The apparent parthood relations considered in later sections of this paper typically
arise from lack of clarity in specification of properties or due to imprecision (of fuzziness).
This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 5.2 (Cold vs Influenza). Detection of influenza within 48 hours of catching
it is necessary for effective treatment with anti-virals, but often patients fail to under-
stand subtleties in distinguishing between cold and influenza. It is also not possible to
administer comprehensive medical tests in a timely cost-effective way even in the best
of facilities. So ground breaking insights even in restricted contexts can be useful.
The two medical conditions have similar symptoms. These may include fever - as
indicated by elevated temperatures, feverishness - as indicated by personal experience
(this may not be accompanied by fever), sneezing, running nose, blocked nose, headache
of varying intensity,cough and body pain. Body pain is usually a lot more intense in case
of flu (but develops after a couple of days).
Clearly, in the absence of confirmatory tests patients can believe both instances of
cold is apparently part of flu and instances of flu is apparently part of cold. These
statements are in dialectical contradiction to each other but no dialetheias are involved.
Cold and flu are also in dialectical contradiction to each other. This is a useful and
relevant formalism.
It is another matter that if glutty negations are permitted then apparently part of
can as well be replaced by part of.
6. Figures of Dialectical Opposition
The scope of counting strategies and nature of possible models can be substantially
improved when additional dialectical information about the nature of order-theoretic
relation between rough and crisp objects is used. In the literature on generalizations
of the square of opposition to rough sets, as in Ciucci (2016); Ciucci et al. (2012), it
is generally assumed that realizations of such relations is the end result of semantic
computations. This need not necessarily be so for reasons that will be explained below.
In classical rough sets, a subset X of objects O results in a tri-partition of O into
the regions L(X) (corresponding to lower approximation of X), B(X) (the boundary
region) and E(X) (complement of the upper approximation). These form a hexagon of
opposition (see Fig.2). In more general rough sets, this diagram generalises to cubes of
opposition Ciucci et al. (2012).
The general strategy used in a forthcoming paper is illustrated in Fig.3.
Some idea of parthood related ordering in the form of the following relations (a
deeper understanding of ontology is essential for making sense of the vague usage (this
is explored in Mani (2013-15))) can suffice in application contexts of any dialectical
generalised scheme of the square or hexagon of opposition (examples have already been
provided earlier):
AP Is Apparently Part of: understood from class, property, expected behavior, or some
other perspective.
APN Is Apparently not Part of.
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L(X) ∪ E(X)
L(X) E(X)
U(X) (L(X))c
B(X)
Figure 2. Hexagon of Opposition
AP0 Is Apparently Neither Part of Nor Not Part of.
CP Is Certainly Part of.
CPN Is Certainly Not Part of.
CP0 Is Certainly Neither Part of Nor Not Part of. (This is intended to convey uncertainty)
AI Is Apparently Indistinguishable from.
CI Is Certainly Indistinguishable from.
AW Is Apparently a Whole of
AWN Is Apparently Not a Whole of.
AW0 Is Apparently Neither a Whole of Nor Not a Whole of.
CW Is Certainly a Whole of.
CWN Is Certainly not a Whole of.
CW0 Is Certainly Neither a Whole of Nor Not a Whole of.
By the word apparently, the agent may be referring to the lack of models, properties
possessed by the objects, relativised views of the same among other possibilities. For
example, the word apparently can refer to the absence of any clear models about con-
nections between diseases in data from a hospital chain in a single city or it can refer
to problems caused by lack of data or relativizations about expected state of affairs
relative to pre-existing models. Fuzzy and degree valuations of these perceptions are
even less justified due to the use of approximate judgments. Predicates like AP0, CP0
are needed for handling indecision (which is likely to be happen often in practice).
As pointed out by a reviewer, AP, APN and AP0 form three-fourths of Belnap’s useful
4-valued logic Belnap (1977). In this regard it should be noted that only those dialectical
oppositions that can be sustained by inference procedures for progression of knowledge
are relevant for logic.
The above set of predicates can be split into the following subsets of interest:
• Pure Apparence: AP, APN, AP0, AW, AWN, AW0
• Pure Certainty: CP, CPN, CP0, CW, CWN, CW0
• Mixed Apparence: AP, APN, AP0, AW, AWN, AW0, AI
• Mixed Certainty: CP, CPN, CP0, CW, CWN, CW0, CI
• Pure: AP, APN, AP0, AW, AWN, AW0, CP, CPN, CP0, CW, CWN, CW0
30
Crude Data
Parthood Dialectical Polyhedron
Dialectical Counts
Semantics, Logic
Figure 3. Dialectical Semantics by Counting
• Mixed: Union of all the above
Before proceeding further it is necessary to fix the philosophical concepts of Con-
tradiction, Contrariety, Sub-contrariety and Sub-alternation because the literature on
these concepts is vast and there is much scope for varying their meaning (see for exam-
ple Ioan (1998); Schang (2012)). One way of looking at the connection between truth
value assignments and sentences, necessary for the diagram to qualify in the square of
opposition (generalised) paradigm, is illustrated in Table.1, 2, 3, 4 below (NP means the
assignment is not possible) :
α β CY(α, β)
T T NP
T F T
F T T
F F T
Table 1. Contrariety
α β {(α, β)
T T NP
T F T
F T T
F F NP
Table 2. Contradiction
α β SCY(α, β)
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F NP
Table 3. Sub-Contrariety
α β AN(α, β)
T T T
T F NP
F T T
F F T
Table 4. SubAlternation
The PQ semantics Moretti (2012) tries to take a simplified view of the situation.
It may appear that the main problem with the proposal is a lack of suitable logical
operators. But this drawback is not likely to be that significant for the counting based
approach introduced in this paper and developed further in a forthcoming paper. The
PQ approach in question is to look for answers to the questions:
• TT: Can the sentences be true together?
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• FT: Can the sentences be false together?
After finding those answers, categories can be worked out according to Table.5.
TT
FT
1 0
1 Sub-alternation Sub-Contrariety
0 Contrariety Contradiction
Table 5. An Opposition
But dialectical contradiction requires additional categories that relate to the following
questions:
• Dialethia: Can any one of the two statements be both true and false together? (Let
δ(A) be the statement that A is both false and true together).
• Bi-Dialectic: Is either statement in dialectical opposition to the other? (Let i(A,B)
be the statement that A is dialectically opposed to B).
• Dialectic: Is either statement a statement expressing dialectical opposition? (Let
β(A) be the statement that A expresses dialectical opposition with β being a
particular associated predicate).
The above realization of the concept of dialetheia is pretty clear for implementation,
but the latter two forms of dialectic depend on the choice of predicates and so many in-
terpretations would be possible. In a typical concrete case, the parthood(s), the dialectical
predicate and figure of opposition should be defined in order to obtain concrete answers.
The Question-Answer Semantic approach (QAS) of Schang (2012) constitutes a rel-
atively more complete strategy in which the sense of a sentence α is an ordered set
of questions Q(α) = 〈q1(α), . . . , qr(α)〉 and its reference is an ordered set of answers
A(α) = 〈a1(α), . . . , ar(α)〉. These answers can be coerced to binary form (with possible
responses being Yes or No).
If the dialectical approach of the present paper is extended to QAS approach, then
the number of possible questions (like can question A and B be true together?) becomes
very large and suitable subsets that are as efficient as the whole would be of interest.
The possibilities are indicated in Table.6.
A T F i δ δ β β β β δ δ δ
B T F i δ i β i T F T F β
Table 6. Potential Combinations
Connectives and operations can be involved in the definition of these predicates, but
in the general case the meta concept of suitable subsets can only be roughly estimated
and not defined unambiguously. Even apparent-parthood related statements can be
handled by the answer set after fixing the necessary subsets of the question set. In
a separate paper, it is shown by the present author that counting procedures can be
initiated with the help of this strategy.
Relative to the nature of truth values, two approaches to the problem can be adopted:
(1) Keep the concept of truth and falsity fixed and attempt suitable definitions of
oppositions or
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(2) Permit variation of truth and falsity values. This in general would amount to
deviating further from classical opposition paradigms.
6.1. Classical Case-1: Fixed Truth
When the concept of truth is not allowed to vary beyond the set {T, F}, then it is
apparently possible to handle the cases involving apparent parthood without special
external rules. A natural question that arises in the context of certain parthoods is
about the admissibility of truth values. These aspects are considered in this subsection.
One instructive (but not exhaustive) way is to read CPab as all a with property pi(a)
and none of properties in ¬pi(a) (in the domain of discourse) are part of any b with property
pi(b). As a consequence CPNab is all a with property pi(a) and none of properties in ¬pi(a)
(in the domain of discourse) are not part of any b with property pi(b).
In rough sets, the association of objects with properties happen only when mecha-
nisms of associations are explicitly specified or are specifiable. There is much freedom
to choose from among different mechanisms of associations in a abstract perspective. In
praxis, these choices become limited but rarely do they ever become absent. Implicit in
all this is the assumption of stable choice among possible mechanisms of associations.
The stability aspect is an important research direction.
If truth tables for determining the nature of opposition is attempted using ideas of
state resolution (instead of connectives) then perplexing results may happen. The choice
of connectives is in turn hindered by an excess of choice. So the minimalist perspective
based on two questions or the QAS-type approach should be preferred.
The following two theorems require interpretation.
Theorem 6.1. The truth tables corresponding to two of the pairs
formed from AP, APN, AP0 have the form indicated in Table.7, 8(P ∗Q is the resolution
of the state relating to P and Q. This is abbreviated in the tables by ∗ ):
APpq APNpq ∗
T T IN
T F T
F T T
F F IN
Table 7. Contradiction?
APpq AP0pq ∗
T T IN
T F T
F T T
F F IN
Table 8. Contradiction?
(IN is an abbreviation for indeterminate.)
Proof. The proof is direct. However, the interpretation is open and it is possible to
read both tables as corresponding to contradiction.
Theorem 6.2. The truth tables corresponding to the pairs formed from CP, CPN, CP0
and the pair CP, CI have the form indicated in
Table.9,10,11,12 (NP is an abbreviation for not possible):
Proof. The proof consists in checking the possibilities by cases. In the table for CP and
CP0, the last line is justified because no possibilities are covered by the last column.
From the safer (and questionable) two question framework, the above two theorems
have the following form:
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CPpq CPNpq ∗
T T NP
T F T
F T T
F F NP
Table 9. Contradiction
CPpq CP0pq ∗
T T NP
T F T
F T T
F F T
Table 10. Contrariety
CPNpq CP0pq *
T T NP
T F T
F T T
F F NP
Table 11. Contradiction
CIpq CPpq ∗
T T T
T F NP
F T T
F F T
Table 12. Sub-alternation
Theorem 6.3. The answers to the two simultaneity (Sim) questions for the pairs
formed from AP, APN, AP0 are in Table.13,14.
APab APNab Sim
T T NP
F F NP
Table 13. Contradiction
APab AP0ab Sim
T T T
F F NP
Table 14. Sub-Contrariety
(NP is an abbreviation for not possible.)
Proof. In the table for AP, AP0, TT discludes all possibilities and therefore yields T.
Other parts are not hard to prove.
Theorem 6.4. The simultaneity data corresponding to the pairs
formed from CP, CPN, CP0 are in Table.15,16,17,18.
Proof. In Table 16, for example, the question is can both CPab be false and CP0ab
be false? As the situation is impossible, NP is the result.
6.2. Case-2: Pseudo Gluts
A minimalist use of assumptions on possible grades of truth in the cases admitting
apparent parthood leads to the following diagram of truth values. The figure is biased
against falsity because in the face of contradiction agents are expected to be truth
seeking - this admittedly is a potentially contestable philosophical statement.
Reading of truth tables in relation to state transition based conjunction is also rel-
evant for dialectical interpretation. But these are not handled by the above tables and
will be part of future work.
For the dialectical counting procedures introduced in the next section, the basic
contexts are assumed to be very minimalist and possibly naive. In these some meta
principles on aggregation of truth can be useful or natural. The states of truth mentioned
in Fig.4 relate to the following meta method of handling apparent truth. These will be
referred as Truth State Determining Rules (TSR). In the rules α, β are intended in
particular for formulas having the form Pab and variants.
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CPab CPNab Sim
T T NP
F F NP
Table 15. Contradiction
CPab CP0ab Sim
T T NP
F F NP
Table 16. Contradiction
CPNab CP0ab Sim
T T NP
F F NP
Table 17. Contradiction
CIab CPab Sim
T T T
F F T
Table 18. Sub-alternation
Truth State Determining Rules
• If α is apparently true and β supports it, then α becomes more true.
• If α is apparently true and β opposes it, then α becomes less true.
• If α is less true (than true is supposed to be) and β opposes it, then α becomes even
less true.
• If α is apparently false and β opposes it, then α becomes less false.
• In the figure, T denotes an intermediate truth value that can become stronger T∗, T∗
or weaker T	,T	. This is because operators (apparently) like less and even less
are available.
The above list of rules can be made precise using the distance between vertices in the
graph and thus it would be possible to obtain truth values associated with combinations
of sentences involving apparent parthood alone.
6.3. Counting Procedures and Dialectical Opposition
A brief introduction to the dialectical counting procedures and semantics invented by
the present author is included in this subsection. The full version will appear in a
separate paper.
New concepts of rough natural number systems were introduced in Mani (2012b)
from both formal and less-formal perspectives. These are useful for improving most
rough set-theoretical measures in general rough sets and in the representation of rough
semantics. In particular it was proved that the algebraic semantics of classical RST
can be obtained from the developed dialectical counting procedures. In the counting
contexts of Mani (2012b), a pair of integers under contextual rules suffices to indicate
the number associated with the element in an instance of the counting scheme under
consideration. This is because those processes basically use a square of discernibility
with the statements at vertices having the following form:
• IS.NOT(a, b) meaning a is not b.
• IS(a, b) meaning a is identical with b.
• IND(a, b) meaning a is indiscernible from b.
• DIS(a, b) meaning a is discernible from b.
A particular example of such a counting method is the indiscernible predecessor based
primitive counting (IPC). The adjective primitive is intended to express a minimal
use of granularity and related axioms. Let S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . , } be an at most
countable set of elements in ZF that correspond to some collection of objects. If R is a
binary relation on S that corresponds to is weakly indiscernible from, then IPC takes
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T∗
T∗
T
F	
F	
T	
T	
F
Figure 4. Weak and Strong Truths
the following form:
6.3.0.1. Indiscernible Predecessor Based Primitive Counting (IPC). In this
form of ’counting’, the relation with the immediate preceding step of counting matters
in a crucial way.
(1) Assign f(x1) = 11 = s0(11).
(2) If f(xi) = sr(1j) and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R, then assign f(xi+1) = 1j+1.
(3) If f(xi) = sr(1j) and (xi, xi+1) /∈ R, then assign f(xi+1) = sr+1(1j).
For example, if S = {f, b, c, a, k, i, n, h, e, l, g,m} and R is the reflexive and transitive
closure of the relation
{(a, b), (b, c), (e, f), (i, k), (l,m), (m,n), (g, h)}
then S can be counted in the presented order as below.
{11, 21, 12, 13, 23, 14, 24, 34, 15, 25, 16, 26}, (IPC)
Rough counting methods like the above have nice algebraic models and can also
be used for representing semantics. The dialectical approaches of the present paper
motivate generalizations based on the following:
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IS.NOT(a, b)
IND(a, b) IS(a, b)
DIS(a, b)
i
Figure 5. Rough Counting
• Counting by Dialectical Mereology: This method of counting is intended to be
based on the principle that the mereological relation of the object being counted
with its predecessors should determine its count and the enumeration should be on
convex regular polygons (including squares and hexagons of opposition), polyhe-
drons or generalizations thereof (polytopes) of dialectical and classical opposition.
• Counting by Threes: This is based on the principle that the relation between
the object being counted with its predecessor and the mereological relation of
the object with its successor should determine its count. The approach admits of
many variations.
• Counting by Reduction to Discernibility: It is also possible to count taking in-
creasing scopes of discernibility into account.
Further Directions and Remarks
In this research paper all the following have been accomplished by the present author
(apart from contributing to the solution of some inverse problem contexts)
• Formalization of possible concepts of dialectical contradiction has been done in
one possible way using object level predicates.
• The difference between dialetheias and dialectical contradiction has been clari-
fied. It has been argued that dialectical contradiction need not be reducible to
dialetheias or be associated with glutty negation. But the latter correspond to
Hegelian dialectical contradiction.
• A pair of dialectical rough semantics have been developed over classical rough sets.
The nature of parthood is reexamined and used for counting based approaches to
semantics.
• Opposition in the context of rough set and parthood related sentences is investi-
gated and concepts of dialectical opposition and opposition are generated. Related
truth tables show that the classical figures do not work as well for parthood related
sentences. This extends previous work on figures of opposition of rough sets in new
directions. A major contribution is in the use of dialectical negation predicates in
the generation of figures of opposition.
• Possible diagrams of opposition are used for defining generalised counting process
for constructive algebraic semantics. This builds on earlier work of the present
37
author in Mani (2012b).
• The antichain based semantics for general rough sets that has been developed in
Mani (2015, 2017b) has been supplemented with a constructive dialectical count-
ing process and scope for using generalised negations in a separate paper. The
foundations for the same has been laid in this paper.
Sub-classes of problems that have been motivated by the present paper relate to
• Formal characterization of conditions that would permit reduction of dialectical
contradiction to dialetheia.
• Construction of algebraic semantics from dialectical counting using figures of op-
position.
• Construction of general rough set algorithms from the antichain based dialectics.
• Algebraic characterization of parthood based semantics as opposed to rough object
based approaches. This problem has been substantially solved by the present
author in Mani (2017b).
• Methods of property extraction by formal interpretation or translation across
semantics - this aspect has not been discussed in detail in the present paper and
will appear separately.
• Development of logics relating to glutty negation in the context of suitable rough
contexts.
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